Reconstruction was of course taking place in different forms across Europe, but the French version was exceptional in its duration, in the range of policy areas embraced by the resurgent state, and in its consequences: it gave rise to two new constitutions in and , and two major colonial wars in Indochina and Algeria.
Chapman argues that the French process was singular, too, in the privileged role it gave to technocratic elites as part of its experiment with new kinds of democratic governance. Instead, Chapman finds Tocquevillian elements of continuity across the whole period, and argues provocatively that the events of were much less consequential when seen in terms of their effect on state power. The reconstitution of the state was also achieved by integrating the maquis militias into French army units, and reorganising the senior levels of the bureaucracy. The authorities were forced to expand the domain of state action in response to local pressures, regulating the food market and nationalising the coalmines in the north, whose operators had collaborated with the Nazis.
In southern France, where communist-dominated resistance networks remained active, the state came under pressure to carry out significant purges of the police force, many of whose members had compromised themselves under Vichy. The emblem of state resurgence in the postwar years was the policy of nationalisation, pursued by governments between and Many other European countries adopted public ownership, or created works committees involving the state, management and labour, or sought to develop institutions to advise on long-term planning.
France was the only country, however, that combined all three measures, and opinion polls showed that these policies enjoyed overwhelming public support. But Chapman cautions against an excessively heroic narrative. The takeovers in the banking, energy and transport sectors reflected a range of political and industrial concerns, and management structures varied considerably. By the early s, the state had asserted its power over nationalised industries, and managerial control passed into the hands of senior civil servants.
Sudhir Hazareesingh reviews ‘France’s Long Reconstruction’ by Herrick Chapman · LRB 23 May
These measures marked a major departure from traditional corporate culture. Family policy was another area in which the state enacted significant legislation during the postwar years, chiefly a comprehensive system of family allowances. In some areas the grand technocratic schemes fell well short of their initial ambitions.
The most obvious example is the attempt to regulate immigration and control the supply of foreign labour. This was a major departure from the interwar years, when such efforts were largely left to the private sector. The original plan, drafted by Jean Monnet, set a huge annual target of , workers. Among the main reasons were the reluctance of foreign governments to co-operate, the inevitable conflicts between different elements of the French bureaucracy, the absence of decent housing provision in France, and union hostility the CGT believed, not unreasonably, that an influx of foreign workers would drive down wage levels.
The ONI also failed to encourage workers from Algeria, where there was a potential supply of willing migrants. Despite the pleas of the governor of Algeria and the French Ministry of Urban Reconstruction, the recruitment of North African labour was blocked, mainly on grounds of ethnic prejudice. Both were staunch Jacobins, who saw themselves as part of a long tradition of progressive reform and believed in the enabling role of the state.
It was not unlike an enlightened form of Bonapartism. Even before its position at the apex of the French state had been consolidated, the new technocracy was vigorously challenged. Chapman finds intriguing evidence of the roots of these protests in the archives of the Ministry of Justice, which in documented a wave of agitation against state-imposed price controls in small towns across impoverished regions of the west, the south-west and the Massif Central — areas which subsequently became the heartlands of Poujadism.
The movement drew on older traditions of popular protest: in one case, a tax inspector was paraded across town on a pig cart, echoing the humiliating ritual of the charivari.
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But Chapman also underscores the use of more modern forms of direct action against tax collectors in , the Finance Ministry admitted that only 60 per cent of the hundred thousand scheduled tax inspections had taken place. Recognising the strength of the Poujadist challenge, the government prudently backtracked, and in the long run the state became more responsive to public pressure over tax. The fight, he thought, would come from the colonies and the remnant French armies and navy.
But the colonies were of limited value; for a while, the only pledge of support de Gaulle got was from New Hebrides, in the South Pacific, not hugely useful for a European war. Only when, with the help of Moulin, he saw that there was resistance within the occupied country did his tactics and politics change. De Gaulle, realizing that he had to move left to hold the center, then had to execute a complex dance.
The Communist Party of France was a slavishly obedient arm of Stalinism and the Soviet Union—which did not alter the other reality that, after the invasion of Russia, in , many of the most courageous of the resisters would be Communists. Moulin had credibility with all sides; de Gaulle took on some of it. This was critical as he sought to thread his way through a maze of sects and sides.
On a single page of this biography one encounters the C. It was enough that he understood that democracy had become one of the instincts of France. People of all sides who met de Gaulle were exasperated by him, but mostly they were impressed by him—by the way his personality was enfolded in his politics, and his politics in his personality.
To a large degree, his unwillingness to bend, his intransigence are willed. He likes to say that being as weak as he is, intransigence is his only weapon. Moulin was eventually tortured to death by Klaus Barbie, betrayed to the Gestapo in circumstances that remain murky. And he did. If this triumph allowed the French to evade what had actually happened during the war—the abject armistice with Hitler, the delivery of the deportees to their persecutors, the entire black hole of Vichy from which so little light escaped for so long—it did put France in a position to, well, go on.
Now that he was a head of government, his theatrical tactics backfired. The Fourth Republic that emerged largely after his resignation from government was, as Jackson itemizes, far more of a success than is often allowed. They more or less took charge in Algiers, and demanded a change of government in Paris. The complexities of the Algerian crisis are still tragic to read about. The O. This was, as everyone knew at the time, a sellout of the pieds noirs , the huge community of French nationals in Algeria, for whom it had been as much a home as any other department of France.
As Jackson says, de Gaulle got exactly what any other French politician would have: a surrender with the barest fig leaf. One thinks of the long fall of Vietnam, where what was achieved in was also what would have happened in anyway, with fewer deaths along the way. The pieds noirs were left helpless, as were the Harkis, Algerian Muslims who had fought with the French Army. But, at the same time, de Gaulle rebuilt France and made it modern. The effects of these reforms could be salubrious.
France became, in many respects, an even more extraordinarily well-run state; anyone who has had encounters with the upper reaches of the hautes fonctionnaires class of the Fifth Republic still has to be impressed with their level of education, worldliness, and efficiency.
And the effects could also be infuriating: France remained an extraordinarily bureaucratic state, too. Anyone who has ever had regular contact with the lower reaches of the administrative regime will know of the parallel paper, or pixelated, universe in which no event has occurred on earth until it has a folder in a file. Jackson writes wonderful political history, but social history does not sneak into his work very often or very well: the larger world of literature and commentary in which French political life is always entangled is not dramatized with any relish, giving the biography a slightly dutiful monotone.
Sartre was at one point during the Algerian war so extreme in his support of the F. It was as keenly symbolic of Gaullist triumph as any law or edict, but, though the alteration is mentioned, we never really see it or feel it.
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Jackson does make us feel one consequential flaw in the Fifth Republic as a political invention. By seeming to concentrate so much power in one regal figure, de Gaulle made it possible to rule France again, but also insured that opposition would have to be impassioned and clamorous to register at all. Prime Ministers, when they become unpopular, are eased out by their supporters; kings, when they become unpopular, must be thrown out by a mob. Afterward, theatrical mini-revolutions became the norm in French politics.
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The ability of each new President to survive the coming wave of street protests became even more important than his ability to hold the legislature together. Of the anti-government demonstrations that de Gaulle confronted, the most famous manif was the one that proved fatal to his career: the student rebellion that began in the streets of Paris and then spread to the factories outside it.
De Gaulle retreated to his country house, and seemed on the brink of resignation. Instead, he returned to Paris and led an immense counter-demonstration. It was a reminder that the center of popular gravity in France remained on the right, even as its mind and imagination remained on the left; in elections held in June, the Gaullist party gained an outright parliamentary majority.
For all that, the Events of May seemed to exhaust him spiritually; he resigned only a year later, after losing an insignificant referendum on regional reform. It was a form of ritual political suicide. The Allies would have retaken France with or without him, and some French politician would have taken that walk in France was going to surrender Algeria sooner or later; all de Gaulle did was extend the fight and put a noble face on the surrender. He knew this as well as anyone. The whole thing is a perpetual illusion. Worse, by placing myth over history, he injected a toxic hallucinogen into French memory.
It took decades for France to begin to address the reality of Vichy. Almost to this day, the reality of the civil war that Algeria ignited in France is obscured: the drowning, by the police, of perhaps five hundred Algerians in Paris in was suppressed at the time, and is barely commemorated now.
There is a side of de Gaulle that is merely hateful: vindictive and vain and deeply selfish. His ingratitude to the British, who had saved his life and given him a platform to save his country—an ingratitude that became almost obsessively bitter in his memoirs—is unforgivable, except as a reminder of the truth that we always resent most those to whom we owe most. Yet this account misses the central lesson that de Gaulle intuited: myths matter.
Without a sense of shared symbols, it is impossible for any modern state to go on.watch
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France is a frustrating state, but it has never been a failed one. It works. National dignity is hugely important to any program of national renewal. De Gaulle crafted a symbolic history for the French in place of a real one, because symbols were among the most real things they knew. The patriot loves his place and its cheeses and its people and its idiosyncrasies; the nationalist has no particular sense of affection for the actual place he advocates for he is often an outsider to it but channels his obsessive grievances into acts of ethnic vengeance.
De Gaulle is a nearly perfect example of the right-wing patriot in power—of the constitutional conservative who accepts the modern order. With his love of honor and pageantry, de Gaulle might seem to offer a very dated model of politics. The politics of grandeur, he shows, need not be the exclusive province of bullies and gangsters and crooks and clowns.
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